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CASE NOTES
ANTITRUST LAW-THE CLAYTON
ACT-"ENGAGED
IN COMREQUIREMENT
OF SECTION
7-United States u. American
Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U.S. 271 (1975).
MERCE"

American Building Maintenance Industries (American), a
nationwide corporation supplying ten percent of the janitorial
services in southern California,l acquired the stock of both the J.
E. Benton Management Corporation and the Benton Maintenance Company and merged the latter company into a wholly
owned subsidiary of American. At the time, the two Benton companies (Benton) taken together were the fourth largest supplier
of janitorial services in southern California, with approximately
seven percent of the total sales. In the course of its operations,
Benton performed janitorial and maintenance service for several
customers who were engaged in interstate commerce. All of Benton's contracts were performed within California, however, and
almost all of its supplies were purchased from local distribut0rs.l
Benton did not advertise nationally and made only limited use
of interstate communication system^.^
The United States brought a civil antitrust suit against
American, alleging that the acquisition and merger of Benton
might substantially lessen competition in the sale of janitorial
services in southern California4and thereby constitute a violation
of section 7 of the Clayton Act.5The district court granted American's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Benton
1. American was the largest supplier of janitorial services in southern California. In
that area alone, American's janitorial service revenues for 1969 were $10.9 million. Brief
for Appellant at 4, United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
2. Between January 1, 1969, and February 28, 1970, Benton's direct purchases in
interstate commerce amounted to less than $140.00. 422 U.S. a t 274 n.4.
3. Between January 1969 and June 1970, Benton mailed less than 200 letters across
state lines. 422 U.S. at 274 n.3. Between January 1969 and June 1970, Benton paid Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph $18,260.45 for telephone services. Only $19.78 represented
charges for out-of-state calls related to business. Appendix at 213, United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Appendix].
4. The Government asserted in the complaint that the action of American may substantially lessen competition for the following reasons: (1) Actual and potential competition between American and Benton has been eliminated. (2) Benton has been eliminated
as a substantial factor in competition. (3) American has increased in relative size to such
a point that its advantage over its competitors threatens to be decisive. (4) Concentration
in the sale of janitorial services has increased to the detriment of actual and potential
competition. Appendix at 8.
5. 15 U.S.C. 5 18 (1970).
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companies were not engaged in commerce and that therefore the
court lacked jurisdiction under section 7.' On direct appeal, the
Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1)that the "engaged in commerce" requirement of section 7 means directly engaged in the
flow of interstate commerce and is not satisfied by an intrastate
corporation whose activities substantially affect interstate commerce, and (2) that under the facts of the instant case, Benton
was not engaged in the flow of interstate commerce. Three justices dissented,' arguing that the "engaged in commerce" test
should be held to extend to all corporations whose activities substantially affect interstate commerce.

The Clayton Act was one of several statutes8 enacted under
the commerce clause of the Constitution9to arrest the threat of
increasing monopolization and concentrated control of industry. lo
The jurisdictional test of each of these antitrust statutes is set
forth in slightly different language, resulting in differing interpretations of the extent of the commerce power used by Congress in
enacting each statute.
A.

The Sherman Antitrust Act

The Sherman Act," enacted in 1890, was the first of the
antitrust statutes; it prohibits all combinations in the form of
trusts and conspiracies "in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States." In United States v. E. C. Knight,12the first
decision of the Supreme Court interpreting the Sherman Act, the
Court weakened the Act by concluding that manufacturing was
not commerce and hence beyond the power of Congress to regu6. The district court's decision is unreported.
7. 422 U.S. a t 286 (dissent of Douglas & Brennan, JJ.). Id. at 287 (dissent of Blackmun, J.).
8. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § § 1-3 (Supp. I, 1975), 15 U.S.C. § § 4-7
(1970); Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. $8 8-11 (1970); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. $§ 41-44,474, 51-58 (1970), 15 U.S.C.A. $8 45-46, 49-50 (Supp. I, 1975); Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. $8 12-27,44 (1970); Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C.
$4 13, 13a-b, 21a (1970); Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1970).
9. "Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. See, e.g., D. MARTIN,MERGERS
AND THECLAYTON
Am 43-46 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as MARTIN].
11. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. $0 1-3 (Supp. I, 1975), 15 U.S.C. § § 4-7
(1970).
12. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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late.13 Signs of a revival began four years later,14and in Standard
Oil Co. v. United States15 the Court overruled the holding in
Knight that manufacturing is beyond the reach of Congress.16The
Supreme Court has since expanded its interpretation of the commerce provision of the Sherman Act pursuant to the notion that
"Congress [in passing the Sherman Act] wanted to go to the
utmost extent of its Constitutional power. . . ."I7 In Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,l8 for example,
the Court held that the Sherman Act extends to intrastate transactions which substantially affect interstate commerce.lg In a few
cases, the courts have denied Sherman Act jurisdiction over activities20that Congress could possibly reach under the commerce
clause. But it is generally assumed that the Sherman Act extends
to the limit of congressional power under the commerce clause.21

B. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
Enacted at the same time as the Clayton Act, section 5 of the
13. Id. a t 16, 17 (In the E.C. Knight case, the Court reviewed American Sugar Refining Company's acquisition of almost complete control of the manufacture of refined sugar
within the United States.).
14. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (A combination of iron pipe manufacturers was held to restrain interstate commerce. Knight was
distinguished as a combination in which the parties had not agreed about the future
disposition of the manufactured products.). See also Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908);
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
15. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
16. Id. a t 68, 69. The interpretation in Knight had "been so necessarily and expressly
decided to be unsound as to cause the contentions to be plainly foreclosed and to require
no express notice." Id.
17. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944).
Accord, United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945); United States
v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975); Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d
373 (9th Cir. 1973); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1077 (1972). But see Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustee of Rex Hosp., 511 F.2d 678
(4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 33 (1975) (No. 74-1452); Evanston Cab Co. v. City
of Chicago, 325 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964).
For a discussion of different interpretations of the commerce provision of the Sherman
L.J. 236; Note, Portrait
Act see Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman Act, 1959 DUKE
of the Sherman Act as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV.323 (1974).
18. 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
19. Id. a t 232-35.
20. See United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952) (medical
practice); Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1958) (medical practice); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex
Hosp., 511 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 33 (1975) (No. 74-1452)
(hospital health care services); Kallen v. Nexus Corp., 353 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Ill. 1973)
(bar review course); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (taxicab services); Evanston Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 325 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
V.S. 943 (1964) (taxicab services).
21. See cases cited note 17 supm.
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Federal Trade Commission
prohibits "unfair methods of
competition in commerce." In 1935, Congress considered amending secton 5 to read "unfair methods of competition . . . in or
affecting commerce"23 because the Federal Trade Commission
had found "numerous unfair methods of competition and numerous deceptive acts and practices which, although done in intrastate commerce, seriously affect honest competitors engaged in
interstate commerce."24The bill died in the Senate.25
. ~ ~
The Supreme Court in FTC v. Bunte Brothers, I ~ Crefused
to judicially expand the commerce requirement of section 5 and
held intrastate activities affecting interstate commerce beyond
the reach of the legi~lation.~'
Although Bunte Brothers has never
been judicially overruled, it has been eroded by broader interpretations of "in commerce."28 Recently, Congress overruled Bunte
Brothers by replacing "in commerce" with "in or affecting commerce" in sections 5, 6, and 12 of the Federal Trade Commission
The express purpose of these amendments was to make the
reach of this Act coextensive with congressional power under the
commerce clause .30

C. Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act,31an amendment
22. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970). For a review of the legislative history of the Federal
Trade Commission Act see G. HENDERSON,
THEFEDERAL
TRADE
COMMISSION
ch. I (1924);
Baker & Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Continuing Process of
Redefinition, 7 VILL.L. REV.517, 520-43 (1962).
23. S. REP.NO. 46, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935).
24. Id. a t 1.
25. 80 CONG.REC.2424 (1936). The bill apparently never was reconsidered. Earlier it
had been argued that "Congress had gone as far as it had any lawful right to go when it
undertook to regulate commerce and to deal with unfair practices in commerce." 79 CONG.
REC.1843 (1935) (remarks of Senator Austin).
26. 312 U.S. 349 (1941) (Candy manufacturers in Illinois who used an "unfair method
of competition" were outside the reach of section 5 because their sales, which affected
interstate commerce, were wholly intrastate.).
27. Id. at 355.
28. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
FTC, 366 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 932 (1967);Morton's Inc. v. FTC,
286 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1961); Holland Furnance Co. v. FTC, 269 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 932 (1960).
29. 15 U.S.C.A. $8 45,46(a)-(b),52 (Supp. I, 1975),amending 15 U.S.C. $8 45,46(a)(b), 52 (1970).
30. H.R. REP.NO. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29-31 (1974).
31. 15 U.S.C. $ 13(a) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). For a history of the
enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act see E. KINTNER,
A ROBINSON-PATMAN
PRIMER6PRICE
DISCRIMINATION
UNDER
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT3-23, 559-620
16 (1970); F. ROWE,
(1962) [hereinafter cited as ROWE];Note, T h e Commerce Requirement of the RobinsonPatman Act, 22 HASTINGS
L.J. 1245, 1255-58 (1971).
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to the Clayton Act, prohibits persons "engaged in commerce, in
the course of such commerce," from discriminating in price between different purchasers "where either or any of the purchasers
involved . . . are in commerce."32 As originally passed by the
House, Congressman Patman's version also provided that "[ilt
shall also be unlawful for any person, whether in commerce or
not, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchaser^."^^ This broader language was stricken before final enactment because "the preceding language [the present section 2(a)] already covers all discriminations, both interstate and intrastate, that lie within the limits of Federal author-

it^."^^

The "engaged in commerce" requirement of section 2(a) is of
less importance than the same language in section 7 of the Clayton Act. In section 2(a) litigation, the focus has been on whether
the transactions giving rise to an alleged discrimination are "in
c ~ m m e r c e . "Obviously,
~~
if the sale is "in commerce," the seller
is "engaged in commerce."36The cases have therefore ignored the
"engaged in commerce" requirement and turned on whether one
of the transactions giving rise to the allegedly discriminatory sale
"cross[ed] a state line."37 Recently, in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp
Paving C ~ . , ~ " h e Supreme Court discussed the jurisdictional
reach of section 2(a). The Court reversed a broad interpretation
given to the section by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals39and
-

-

32. The statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or
any of the purchasers involved in such discrimination are in commerce . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
33. H.R. REP. NO. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936).
34. Id.
It has been argued that congressional doubt about the constitutionality of the language of the bill after A.L.A. Schlechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935), led to the deletion of the language. Note, The Commerce Requirement of the
L.J. 1245, 1256 (1971). But see 86 HARV.L. REV.765,
Robinson-Patman Act, 22 HASTINGS
769-72 (1973).
35. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974); Food
Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785, 787 (10th Cir. 1967); Willard Dairy Corp.
v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943, 946 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934
(1963).
36. ROWE78, 79.
37. Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140, 1144 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 178 (10th Cir. 19721,
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972); Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4,
9 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969).
38. 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
39. The Ninth Circuit had stated:
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agreed that at least one of the transactions which resulted in
discrimination must actually "cross a state line."40

D. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
The original section 7 of the Clayton Actd1was intended to
"prohibit and make unlawful certain trade practices which . . .
are not covered by . . . existing antitrust acts and . . . to arrest
the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and monopolies in their incipiency and before c o n s ~ m m a t i o n . " ~
The
~ stimulants for
enactment were a widespread belief that the Sherman Act had
been weakened by the Courtd3in Standard Oil v. United Statesd4
~ ~ the rising fear
and United States v. American Tobacco C O .and
of increasing acquisitions and consolidation^.^^ "Commerce," as
defined in the original Clayton
was considered to be at least
equal to the scope of "commerce" under the Sherman
We see no reason why sales which are "in commerce" because of their nexus
with an instrumentality of interstate commerce must also satisfy a state-line
test of "in commerce." To be sure, the statutory language of the Clayton and
Robinson-Patman Acts is not as broad and flexible as that of the Sherman Act.
Nevertheless, the fact that these acts were intended to supplement the purpose
and effect of the Sherman Act supports a uniform interpretation of the "in
commerce" requirement present in all three acts.
In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 202, 206 (9th Cir. 1973),rev'd sub nom. Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
40. 419 U.S. a t 200 (quoting Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4,
9 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969)).
41. The original section 7 provided in pertinent part:
T h a t no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may
be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is
so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such
commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce.
Clayton Act 6 7, ch. 323, 5 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. J$ 18 (1970).
42. S. REP.NO. 698,63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). Section 7 was intended to eliminate
the aggregation of economic power by stock purchase "so far as it is possible to do so."
H.R. REP. NO. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1914).
43. Levy, The Clayton Act-An Imperfect Supplement to the Sherman Law, 3 VA.
L. REV.411, 414-17 (1916).
44. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
45. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
46. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
A total of 3,238 acquisitions and consolidations were recorded between 1895 and 1905.
NELSON,
MERGER
MOVEMENTS
IN AMERICAN
INDUSTRY,
1895-1956 (1959) (quoted in S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON,
FEDERAL
ANTITRUST
LAWS318 (3d ed. 1968)).
47. " 'Commerce', as used herein, means trade or commerce among the several States
and with foreign nations . . . ." 15 U.S.C. J$ 12 (1970).
48. See H.R. REP. NO. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 7 (1914).
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In 1950, section 7 of the Clayton Act was amended to reach
acquisitions that had not previously been covered by the Act.'"
The amendment, however, continued to employ the original
"engaged in commerce" jurisdictional testesO
Prior to 1950, efforts
had been made to broaden the jurisdictional test,51 but these
efforts were unsuccessful. In 1958, hearings were held on two
bilW2 that would have broadened the "engaged in commerce"
requirement of section 7 by making it applicable when "either the
acquiring corporation" or the acquired corporation "is engaged in
commerce."53Neither bill was enacted.
49. For a review of the legislative history of the amendment see MARTIN
221-53; Bok,
Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV.L. REV.
226, 233-38 (1960); Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the CellerKefauver Antimerger Act, 61 COLUM.L. REV.629, 652-74 (1961); Note, Section 7 of the
Clayton Act; A Legislative History, 52 COLUM.
L. REV.766 (1952); Comment, The Amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 46 Nw. U.L. REV.444 (1951).
There were three principal reasons for the amendment. (1) The Court had construed
the statute to apply only to acquisitions by stock purchase and had exempted asset
acquisitions. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); FTC v.
Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926). (2) It was assumed that 6 7 did not apply to
vertical mergers. H.R. REP.NO. 1191,81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949). (3) Some feared that
the use of the Sherman Act test in 6 7 cases would result in the proscription of small
business mergers. S. REP.NO. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), amending ch. 323, 4 7, 38 Stat. 731, 732 (1914). Section 7
provides in pertinent part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.
Id. (emphasis added).
51. One such effort can be found in H.R. 2357, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), which
reads, in part, as follows:
Whenever the consummation of any plan, undertaking or agreement by or
on behalf of any corporation engaged in or affecting commerce or engaged in
manufacturing or processing for distribution in commerce or by or on behalf of
any of its subsidiaries so engaged, to acquire the whole or any part of the stock
or other share capital or the whole or any part of the assets other than inventories of any other corporation likewise engaged would involve property to the
value of more than $ . . . . . . ., no such plan, undertaking, or agreement by
or on behalf of any corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission under sections 7 or 11 of the Clayton Act, as amended, shall be
consummated, effectuated, and completed except upon and after compliance
with the following requirements: . . . .
Another such effort can be found in H.R. 1240, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
These bills directly resulted from the Temporary National Economic Committee
report suggesting premerger review by the FTC.Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A
Legislative History, 52 COLUM.
L. REV.766 n.3 (1945).
52. S. 198, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. 722, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
53. Hearings on S. 198, S. 721, S. 722, and S. 349 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust

770

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1975:

The reach of section 7 has been subject to varying interpretations by judicial and administrative tribunals. In Transamerica
Corp. v. Board of Governors, 54 the Third Circuit concluded that
"[wle find nothing in the legislative history . . . to indicate that
Congress did not intend by Section 7 to exercise its power under
the commerce clause of the Constitution to the fullest extent."55
The Federal Trade Commission has taken a narrower view. In
Foremost Dairies, Inc. ,56the Commissioner held that a dairy that
sold all of its products intrastate was not "engaged in commerce"
although it had purchased items shipped interstate to a wholesaler's warehouse ?'
The Supreme Court had never directly interpreted the "engaged in commerce" reach of section 7 prior to deciding the instant case, although there were intimations in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Copp Paving Co. that the Court would narrowly construe it?
Interestingly, the suggestion in Gulf of a narrow construction was
ignored by the courts in subsequent decision^.^^ For example,
after quoting extensively from the Gulf opinion, a federal district
court in Gasperi v. Cinemette Corp. of Americaa0concluded that
"[tlhe Supreme Court has thus declared as possibly coming
within the protection of the Clayton Act not only activities 'in
commerce' but also activities having a substantial effect on commerce

In holding that the "engaged in commerce" language of section 7 does not encompass intrastate activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce, the Court relied on the narrow construction given section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 518 (1958).
54. 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
55. Id. at 166 (dictum).
56. 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962).
57. Id. at 1090.
58. 419 U.S. 186, 202 (1974).
This argument [expanding the Clayton Act coexistent with the commerce
clause power] from the history and practical purposes of the Clayton Act is
neither without force nor a t least a measure of support. But whether i t would
justify radical expansion of the Clayton Act's scope beyond that which the
statutory language defines-expansion, moreover, by judicial decision rather
than amendatory legislation-is doubtful.
Id. (footnote omitted).
59. See Gasperi v. Cinemette Corp. of America, 391 F. Supp..826, 830 (W.D. Pa.
1975); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 1975-1Trade Cas. fT 66,233,Y 66,238 (D. Colo. 1975).
60. 391 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
61. Id. at 830.
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Bunte brother^.^^ Since both statutes have "in commerce" requirements, were enacted by the 63d Congress, and were designed
to protect competition, the Court concluded that both should be
. ~ reasoned
~
that the broader construction
similarly c o n ~ t r u e d It
would "give a federal agency pervasive control over myriads of
local businesses in matters heretofore traditionally left to local
custom or local law."64
The government argued that the legislative history and purpose of the Clayton Act indicated that its reach should be coextensive with the commerce clause power. In rejecting that view,
the Court distinguished the language of the Sherman Act from
that of the Clayton Act. The Court reasoned that the prohibitions
against any "restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States"65in the Sherman Act directly concerned impacts on interstate commerce and that therefore the Act reaches intrastate activities having a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The
precise "in commerce" language of section 7, on the other hand,
was interpreted by the Court to require that the activities actually be in interstate commerce.66But more importantly, the
Court concluded that the reenactment of section 7 in 1950 with
the same "in commerce" test was an expression of congressional
approval of the more limited reach. Since Congress must have
been aware of the Bunte Brothers decision, the retention of the
original language was an indication that Congress did not intend
to exercise its full power under the commerce clause.67The Court
focused on the apparent lack of express legislative intent to
broaden the jurisdictional reach68but failed or refused to consider
the broad purpose behind the original enactment of the entire
section.
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined in his dissent by Mr. Justice
Brennan, argued that there was no evidence to indicate that
Congress intended to limit the jurisdictional reach of the Clayton
Act to something less than that of the Sherman Act? He incorpo62. United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 276-77
(1975).
63. Id. at 277.
64. Id. at 276-77 (quoting FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1941)).
65. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (Supp. I, 1975).
66. 422 U.S. at 278.
67. Id. at 277-83.
68. The Court's response to the absence of express congressional action to broaden $
7 is probably best represented in the opinion by the language quoted from Bunte Bros.
that "[aln inroad upon local conditions and local standards of such far-reaching import
as is involved here, ought to await a clearer mandate from Congress." Id. at 276-77
(emphasis added).
69. Id. at 287.
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rated his dissenting arguments in Gulf by referencee70There he
had argued that the Clayton Act definition of commerce, "trade
or commerce among the several states,"71had been held by the
Court to embrace "all commerce save that 'which is confined to
a single State and does not affect other States.' "72 Mr. Justice
Blackmun argued in his separate dissenting opinion that the purpose of the Clayton Act was to supplement the Sherman Act and
that therefore section 7 should similarly be considered an exercise
Both dissenting
of the full commerce clause power by C~ngress.'~
opinions focused on the broader purpose underlying section 7.
Both concluded that the jurisdictional reach of section 7 should
be identical to that of the Sherman

A.

T h e Purpose Underlying Section 7 of the Clayton Act

By focusing on the broad purpose underlying the original
enactment, the Court could have justified a broad interpretation
of the jurisdistional reach of section 7. Since section 7 was designed to supplement the Sherman Act and arrest potential Sherman Act violations "in their incipiency and before consummatied"" and since "the objective was to prevent accretions of power
which 'are individually so minute as to make it difficult to use
the Sherman Act test against them,' "'"t could be argued that
the reach of section 7 should parallel that of the Sherman Act.
"A fundamental purpose of amending 5 7 was to arrest the trend
toward concentration, the tendency to monopoly, before the consumer's alternatives disappeared through merger . . . ."" Argua70. Id. at 286.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
72. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U S . 186, 205-06 (1974) (dissenting opinion) (quoting Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1912)).
73. 422 U S . a t 287.
74. Id. a t 287.
75. S. REP.NO.698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
76. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U S . 271, 280 (1964) (quoting S.
REP. NO. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950).
77. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U S . 321, 367 (1963). For further
indications of the spirit in which the courts have interpreted congressional intent in the
enactment of 4 7, see United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U S . 270, 275 (1966)
("Congress, viewing mergers as a continuous, pervasive threat to small business, passed
$ 7 of the Clayton Act . . . ."); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U S .
271, 281 (1964) ("Rome [company being acquired by Alcoa] seems to us the prototype
of the small independent that Congress aimed to preserve by § 7."); United States v.
Continental Can Co., 378 U S . 441, 461 (1964) ("The case falls squarely within the principle that where there has been a 'history of tendency toward concentration in the industry'
tendencies toward further concentration 'are to be curbed in their incipiency.' "); United

7631

CASE NOTES

773

bly, congressional intent can best be effectuated by extending
section 7 to reach acquisitions of intrastate corporations where
there is a substantial effect on interstate commerce.78
The reliance of the Court on the narrow construction it had
earlier given section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
appears ill-founded. Congress, by broadening the reach of section
5 recently, clearly indicated that the narrow construction given
section 5 in Bunte Brothers was not in harmony with congressional intent.79Section 5, like the Sherman Act, now makes full
use of congressional power under the commerce clause.
The Court's reliance on the restricted reading of section 2(a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act in Gulf also seems inapposite. The
policy of the Robinson-Patman Act of preventing price discrimination has actually been considered a t variance with other antitrust statutes aimed a t promoting c o m p e t i t i ~ n .Further,
~~
the
general "engaged in commerce" requirement of the RobinsonPatman Act is unnecessary in defining that Act's jurisdictional
scope because one of the allegedly discriminating sales must
"cross a state line?' It could be contended, therefore, that section 7 of the Clayton Act, rather than being construed narrowly
as is section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, an arguably dissimilar statute, should be construed as broadly as the Sherman
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170 (1964) ("[Wle are but expounding a
national policy enunciated by the Congress to preserve and promote a free competitive
economy."); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346 (1962) ("We cannot
avoid the mandate of Congress that tendencies toward concentration in industry are to
be curbed in their incipiency, particularly when those tendencies are being accelerated
through giant steps striding across a hundred cities a t a time.").
78. Further support for extending the reach of Q 7 can be found by examining the
congressional intent underlying the other antitrust statutes. This canon bf statutory-construction is designated statutes in pari materia. See C. SANDS,STATUTES
& STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
Q 51.02 (4th ed. 1973).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in FTC u. Motion Picture Advertising Seru. Co.,
wrote:
I am not unaware that the policies directed at maintaining effective competition, as expressed in the Sherman Law, the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act, are difficult to
formulate . . . . It is also incumbent upon us to seek to rationalize the four
statutes directed toward a common end and make of them, to the extent that
what Congress has written permits, a harmonious body of law.
344 U.S. 392, 405-06 (1953).
79. See note 30 supra.
80. Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV.L. REV.1289,
1327-50 (IT h8); Burns, The Anti-trust Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, 4
PROB.301 (1937). But see Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 US. 231, 249
LAWAND CONTEMP.
(1951).
81. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974).
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Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act?
There are intimations in the opinion that the Court felt the
narrow construction of section 7 was necessary to protect small
business by eliminating actions against de minimus mergers.83
But section 7 is by its language limited to those acquisitions in
any section of the country that have the potential to lessen competition or to create a m o n ~ p o l y Since
small business mergers
.~
would not be able to generate the required "substantial" anticompetitive effect, there is no need to protect them a t the threshold jurisdictional stage." On the other hand, a narrow construction of section 7, as is given in the instant case, may very well
operate to injure small businesses by permitting accretions of
monopolistic or anticompetitive power.86
Under the rule of the instant case, there can be no violation
of section 7 as long as the acquired corporation is engaged solely
in intrastate commerce. Perhaps the strongest argument in favor
of extending the reach of section 7 is to close this loophole. American, for example, made 54 acquisitions between 1961 and 1973,
including five janitorial service companies in the Los Angeles
area?' American has also indicated an intention to accelerate this
acquisition program.88 This is precisely the type of gradual
monopolization of an industry that section 7 was enacted to prevent. But as long as these future acquisitions are of intrastate
corporations, American will not be within the reach of section 7
as construed by the Court in the instant case.89Congress must
now consider amending section 7 as it did section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
82. Generally, the reach of statutes enacted under the commerce clause has been
found to be coextensive with full congressional power. Note, Portrait of the Sherman Act
as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV.323, 324-25 (1974).
83. 422 U.S. a t 276-77 (1975).
84. 15 U.S.C. $ 18 (1970) ("where . . . the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.").
85. There was concern a t the time of the amendment of $ 7 in 1950 that the reading
of the Sherman Act test into § 7 was preventing mergers by small businesses. This was
partly remedied by the deletion from the original § 7 of the word community as well as
the wording requiring the corporations to be in competition. The purpose was to proscribe
only those mergers which would potentially have a significant impact. S. REP. NO. 1775,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 7 (1950); H.R. REP.NO. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-8 (1949).
86. See generally United'States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-75 (1966);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 281 (1964).
87. Brief for Appellant a t 4-5.
88. Id. a t 5.
89. If an intrastate corporation such as Benton, however, were to purchase American,
that acquisition would be within reach under the second paragraph of 9 7 which provides
in pertinent part that "[nlo corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital . . . of one or more corporations engaged in
commerce . . . ." 15 U.S.C. $ 18 (1970).

7631

CASE NOTES

775

B. Statutory Construction and Judicial Restraint
The major difficulty with using the preceding arguments to
support a broad interpretation of the reach of section 7 is that it
substitutes an interpretation of congressional intent for the express language of the statute?O The broad interpretation would
require the Court to read "engaged in commerce" as "engaged in
or affecting commerce." There is no clear support in the legislative history for this broader reading? The best argument for expansion that can be made is that Congress intended with the
Clayton Act to supplement the Sherman Act, and therefore section 7, like the Sherman Act, should be considered a full exercise
of congressional power under the commerce clause.92Had this
been its intent in enacting section 7, however, Congress could
have readily manifested it by duplicating the exact wording of the
commerce provision of the Sherman Act and expressly extending
the reach of the statute to corporations that in any way restrained
"trade or commerce among the several States." Instead, Congress
chose to limit the supplememtary legislation to those corporations "engaged in commerce." No consideration was given to
broadening the jurisdictional reach of section 7 a t the time of the
1950 amendment.93Further, in 1958, bills introduced in Congress
to extend the reach of section 7 were defeated.94With such an
unclear legislative history, the canons of statutory construction
generally applied by the Supreme Court support the narrower
interpretation given section 7 in the instant case.95As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter once wrote, "[aln omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however much later wisdom may recommend the inclusion ."96
Also, extending the reach of section 7 may constitute a
judicial usurpation of the legislative function of Congress. The
90. For this same argument in the context of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act see
86 HARV.L. REV.765, 769 (1973).
91. Cf. Handler, Quantitative Substantiality and the Celler-Kefauver Act-A Look
at the Record, 7 MERCER
L. REV.279, 287 (1956) ("The best that can be said about this
legislative history is that it is obscure, ambiguous and inconclusive.").
92. This view was taken by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Transamerica Corp.
v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 166 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U . S . 901 (1953)
(dictum).
93. See notes 49 & 50 and accompanying text supra.
94. See notes 53 & 54 and accompanying text supra.
95. See generally 86 HARV.L. REV.765, 772 & n.36 (1973) (citing Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REV.527 (1947) [hereinafter cited
as Reflections]).
96. Reflections 534.
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proper function of the Court in the instant case was to determine
whether American and the Benton corporations were within the
reach of the statute as written by Congress and not whether they
were within the reach of the statute as it should have been written?' Granted, the statute as interpreted by the Court does not
reach acquisitions of intrastate corporations even where the activities of those corporations affect interstate commerce. A strong
argument can be made that this loophole diminishes the procompetitive and antimonopolistic force of the Clayton Act and should
be closed. However, this argument assumes that industrial concentration is increasing and that acquisitions of intrastate corporations by interstate corporations contribute significantly to that
concentration. On these subjects, economists are in substantial
d i ~ a g r e e m e n t .Congress,
~~
not the courts, is better equipped to
properly resolve this complex factual disagreement and determine the proper reach of section 7?

IV. CONCLUSION
A strong argument exists for the broader reading of section 7. But the argument should be made to Congress. The Supreme Court, in refusing to adopt a broad reading of section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act in Bunte Brothers, argued
that the express language of the statute should be adhered to
unless the purpose of the act would thereby be defeated.loOSuch
an argument applies with full force in the instant case. Congress
did not clearly manifest an intention to use its full power under
the commerce clause when it enacted and amended section 7. The
Court correctly limited the reach of section 7 to the explicit language of the statute.
97. The role of the Supreme Court in reviewing legislation is beyond the scope of this
case note. Suffice it to say that even the most activist of judges agrees that the role of the
Court is to interpret the law and not to make policy choices for society. See generally
Christie, A Model of Judicial Review of Legislation, 48 S. CAL.L. REV.1306, 1342-46
(1975).
98. For a compilation of the varying views, see S. OPPENHEIM
& G. WESTON,
FEDERAL
ANTITRUST
LAWS 317-22 (3d ed. 1968).
99. The contrary conclusion is not compelled by the argument that Congress has
already resolved the question with its amendment of Q 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. Section 5 is concerned only with deceptive acts and practices by manufacturers. It
would be assuming too much to conclude that Congress, with its extension of 4 5, passed
judgment on the advisability or wisdom of permitting interstate corporations to acquire
intrastate businesses free from scrutiny under § 7 of the Clayton Act.
100. 312 U.S. 349, 350-52 (1941).

